Politics and Ideaviruses
While Seth Godin's fascinating article on the concept of an ideavirus seems to be primarily directed at the private sector, it certainly has implications for those of us working in politics.
A successful ideavirus has many similarities to the concept of political buzz; in fact, you could probably argue that political buzz is nothing more than a politically oriented ideavirus. Howard Dean's presidential campaign certainly reached ideavirus status in 2003, as word of his opposition to the war and the Meetup phenomenon spread like wildfire through the liberal side of the political spectrum. However, if you had described his campaign's momentum as resulting from an ideavirus, most people following politics would have said, "Huh?" But if you said his campaign had buzz, few would have disagreed and all would have known what you were talking about, even though it's essentially the same thing.
Several other aspects of the article caught my attention in how they can be applied to the political world. One regards my hobby-horse, tell-a-friend functions for a political website, and is described in the "Answer These Three Questions" section:
You can have a message that lights people up, but if you make it difficult for individuals to pass it on to their friends you won't be able to maximize your impact. Making it easy for website visitors to e-mail pages to their friends, see the latest JibJab cartoon, or even potentially send MMS political messages to one another can only help the ideavirus spread. It's tough enough to come up with an idea powerful enough to spread on its own; removing as much friction as possible from its pathways should be the easy part.
A final point from the article that caught my attention is very relevant to the 2004 presidential campaign:
In terms of political ideaviruses, this is critically important. The passion that many partisans feel towards a political idea lowers the bar for the quality of the idea needed to get people interested in the first place (as opposed to ideas individuals didn't even know they'd ever be interested in), so less than optimized ideas can still spread. However, both their progress and their effectiveness can be hindered by an unfocused idea--or message--something we saw in 2004.
George W. Bush clearly had a more focused message than John Kerry, and I think that made it much easier for his supporters across the country to spread the gospel of George. I recall reading after the election about how much peer-to-peer contact there was on the Republican side, with neighbors speaking directly to neighbors (as opposed to outsiders--like Dean's squad in Iowa--or paid canvasers).
Obviously, being spoken to on your doorstep by a neighbor will be much more persuasive than almost any other form of direct voter contact, but the canvaser needs to be able to deliver a coherent message. If the campaign can't even put forth such a message--and Kerry certainly never did--then that makes the job of the neighborly canvaser much more difficult. I certainly don't have any hard data to back this up, but I would assume the neighbor-to-neighbor contact was much more effective on the Republican side in large part because the message was clearer and easier to deliver.
(It should be noted that the amount of such contact for each side obviously matters as well, and there was probably more passion for Bush on the right than there was for Kerry on the left--as opposed to against Bush. But the clarity of the message could only have helped)
The bottom line is that there are some very good recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness of an ideavirus in the article, many of which translate directly into politics. Well worth checking out.
A successful ideavirus has many similarities to the concept of political buzz; in fact, you could probably argue that political buzz is nothing more than a politically oriented ideavirus. Howard Dean's presidential campaign certainly reached ideavirus status in 2003, as word of his opposition to the war and the Meetup phenomenon spread like wildfire through the liberal side of the political spectrum. However, if you had described his campaign's momentum as resulting from an ideavirus, most people following politics would have said, "Huh?" But if you said his campaign had buzz, few would have disagreed and all would have known what you were talking about, even though it's essentially the same thing.
Several other aspects of the article caught my attention in how they can be applied to the political world. One regards my hobby-horse, tell-a-friend functions for a political website, and is described in the "Answer These Three Questions" section:
2. How smooth is your ideavirus?
In addition to being persistent and cool, an ideavirus needs to be smooth if it's going to spread quickly. If you make it easy for the virus to spread, it's more likely to spread
You can have a message that lights people up, but if you make it difficult for individuals to pass it on to their friends you won't be able to maximize your impact. Making it easy for website visitors to e-mail pages to their friends, see the latest JibJab cartoon, or even potentially send MMS political messages to one another can only help the ideavirus spread. It's tough enough to come up with an idea powerful enough to spread on its own; removing as much friction as possible from its pathways should be the easy part.
A final point from the article that caught my attention is very relevant to the 2004 presidential campaign:
When a sneezer [someone who wants to spread your ideavirus far and wide] is ready to spread your ideavirus, what should he say?
It sounds like a simple, silly question, but it gets at the core issue of making your virus smooth. If you give sneezers easy-to-follow, effective instructions, they're likely to follow them, because, after all, their goal is to spread the virus.
In terms of political ideaviruses, this is critically important. The passion that many partisans feel towards a political idea lowers the bar for the quality of the idea needed to get people interested in the first place (as opposed to ideas individuals didn't even know they'd ever be interested in), so less than optimized ideas can still spread. However, both their progress and their effectiveness can be hindered by an unfocused idea--or message--something we saw in 2004.
George W. Bush clearly had a more focused message than John Kerry, and I think that made it much easier for his supporters across the country to spread the gospel of George. I recall reading after the election about how much peer-to-peer contact there was on the Republican side, with neighbors speaking directly to neighbors (as opposed to outsiders--like Dean's squad in Iowa--or paid canvasers).
Obviously, being spoken to on your doorstep by a neighbor will be much more persuasive than almost any other form of direct voter contact, but the canvaser needs to be able to deliver a coherent message. If the campaign can't even put forth such a message--and Kerry certainly never did--then that makes the job of the neighborly canvaser much more difficult. I certainly don't have any hard data to back this up, but I would assume the neighbor-to-neighbor contact was much more effective on the Republican side in large part because the message was clearer and easier to deliver.
(It should be noted that the amount of such contact for each side obviously matters as well, and there was probably more passion for Bush on the right than there was for Kerry on the left--as opposed to against Bush. But the clarity of the message could only have helped)
The bottom line is that there are some very good recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness of an ideavirus in the article, many of which translate directly into politics. Well worth checking out.
posted by Mike D at
6/12/2005 03:11:00 PM
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